This paper studies a mechanism-design problem involving a principal-supervisor-agent in which collusion between supervisor and agent can only occur after they have decided to participate in the mechanism. We show how collusion can be eliminated at no cost via the use of a mechanism in which the principal endogenously determines the scope of supervision. A simple example of such a mechanism is one in which the agent bypasses the supervisor and directly contracts with the principal in some states of the world. The result that collusion can be eliminated at no cost in this environment highlights the important assumptions required for collusion to be a salient issue in the existing literature. The result is robust to alternative information structures, collusive behaviours and speci…cation of agent's types. Applications include work contracts specifying di¤erent degrees of supervision, self-reporting of crimes, tax amnesties, immigration amnesties and mechanisms based on recommendation letters.
Introduction
Third-party supervision is commonly observed within economic organizations. 1 Usually the need for supervisory activity originates in an information asymmetry between the residual claimant of a productive activity (the principal) and the party that actually carries out the productive activity (the agent). The role of the supervisor 2 is to provide the principal with information concerning actions or characteristics of the agent. This creates a potential for collusion between supervisor and agent, wherein the agent bribes the supervisor to conceal information from the principal. Most studies conclude that collusion is a problem, and that eliminating it is costly for the principal. 3 In this context, the role of collusion in limiting the scope for incentives, the value of hiring supervisors, and the delegation to supervisors, have been examined by many authors in a standard framework that includes asymmetric information between the colluding parties, and the inability to collude prior to making a decision to participate in the mechanism.
This paper focuses on a tool for combating collusion that has been previously overlooked. This tool is based on the idea of selective supervision, where the supervisor may not be engaged by the principal in certain states of the world. Take, for example, a simple mechanism where the agent selects between a regime with supervision and a regime without it. The choice between being supervised or directly contracting with the principal reveals useful information to the principal and reduces the scope of collusion. In the standard framework, we show that it costlessly eliminates collusion.
Thus, if collusion can be easily eliminated in the standard framework, what are the real sources of a collusion problem? To answer this questions we explore several variations of the standard setup in terms of its underlying assumptions. One crucial assumption is the timing of the supervisor's information, i.e., whether the supervisor receives her information before or after being employed by the principal. Based on this assumption, we distinguish between situations where the principal consults an expert (someone who has already received the information) and situations where he hires an auditor (someone who will investigate the agent after being employed).
The previous literature (Celik, 2009 and Faure-Grimaud, La¤ont and Martimort, 2003 -FLM, 1 Owners of a …rm usually delegate the responsibility for supervising production to top managers; stockholders rely on auditors to acquire information about management conduct; managers ask employees to report on the performance of coworkers; and Governments make use of agencies to regulate …rms, auditors to examine tax returns, and inspectors to detect illegal immigration. 2 We refer to the supervisor and the agent respectively as she and he. 3 See for example Tirole (1986) , Tirole (1991,1993) hereafter) focus on the …rst case, where the supervisor is outlined as an expert. Unlike the mechanisms proposed by Celik (2009) and FLM (2003) , selective supervision can costlessly eliminate collusion. 4 This is due to the fact that we do not restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms with full participation. Departing from this restriction is useful because of one important assumption: the agent and the supervisor cannot collude on participation decisions (hereafter referred to as no-collusion in participation decision). 5 Given that participation decisions are collusion-free, the principal can design a rich mechanism where the supervisor's participation decision is used to capture some information on the agent's characteristics. Interestingly, the implementation of selective supervision does not rest on special assumptions about the accuracy of the supervisor's information: the principal can eliminate collusion at no cost even when there is no residual asymmetric information between the supervisor and the agent. Second, we do not require any restrictions on the allocation of bargaining power inside the coalition. Third, the result does not depend on the identity of the coalition member who o¤ers and initiates the collusive agreement. Fourth, the mechanism holds for a quite general speci…cation of the agent's production costs and does not rely on special assumptions about players'utility functions.
In the second part of the paper, we depart from the previous literature by considering the second information timing: namely, the supervisor is an auditor who receives her information after being employed by the principal. This is a realistic case because the supervisor's information is often acquired through an inspection or lengthy investigation, which takes place following the acceptance of the contract. Under this latter timing, the implementation of selective supervision is more challenging.
The reason is that the supervisor has no information on the agent's characteristics when she makes her participation decision. Therefore, the principal cannot use her participation decision to extract information. In fact, the principal can only use the agent's participation decision to achieve this goal.
But extracting information from the agent is more complex: unlike the supervisor, the agent has a productive role and the principal must ensure that his incentive compatibility constraints are met.
Extracting information from the agent's participation decision might con ‡ict with these constraints. As a result, selective supervision can costlessly eliminate collusion only under certain conditions, which are 4 FLM's (2003) mechanism eliminates collusion at zero cost when the supervisor is risk neutral and there are two possible production costs. 5 If the principal can o¤er only a single mechanism (i.e., menu of mechanisms are not allowed), participation decisions are limited to two possibilities: "accept" or "refuse" the mechanism. In this case, if the supervisor is assumed to be indispensable for production, Celik's (2009) and FLM's (2003) results are general and selective supervision cannot improve their mechanisms. We are thankful to David Martimort for his comment. Under these circumstances, the Revelation Principle can be invoked to support the idea that restricting attention to direct revelation and full participation mechanisms is without loss of generality.
related to the structure of the supervisor's information and the speci…cation of the agent's production costs.
Admittedly, the collusion-proof implementation presented in this paper heavily relies on the assumption of no collusion in participation decision. Far from strenuously trying to make a case in favor of this assumption, which is nevertheless plausible in many realistic situations, 6 this paper intends to shed light on those factors that make collusion truly problematic by identifying the factors which are less so.
From this perspective, the present contribution seems to suggest that the assumption of no collusion in participation decision is more or less plausible depending on the timing of the supervisor's information. If the supervisor receives her information before being employed, the assumption of no collusion in participation decision unravels the collusion problem: the latter can be eliminated at no cost. Clearly, the fact that collusion can be easily overcome is in contrast to its persistence in the real-world and feels a bit arti…cial. It follows that allowing for collusion on participation decisions may be a more interesting way of thinking about the problem in this particular framework.
But this conclusion does not hold when we consider the second information timing, i.e., the supervisor is outlined as an auditor. In this case, collusion might be harmful to the principal and increasingly so with the number and dispersion of the possible production costs. The salience of collusion also depends on the structure of the supervisor's information, where the seemingly technical distinction between a structure based on signals (FML, 2003) or connected partitions (Celik, 2009 ) turns out to play a crucial role.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some applications and present the related literature. Section 2 proposes the general model. Section 3 presents the selective supervision mechanism. Section 4 provides some additional comments. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix. 6 It is plausible to assume that there might be several supervisors and agents that can be employed by the principal. In this case, the agent and the supervisor may be matched together after they have decided to participate. This is particularly plausible when the supervisor is an auditor. Under these circumstances, their failure to coordinate participation decisions is due to the impossibility of signing a preemptive side-contract with all eligible supervisors. Consider now the case where the supervisors are experts (they receive their information before being employed).The principal could decide to hire the supervisor after the agent has made his participation decision. In some cases, the use of job rotation for supervisors achieves the same result. In some other cases, the principal can avoid the disclosure of the agent's identity at the participation stage: this precaution makes it di¢ cult for the supervisor to collude since she faces a potentially vast population of eligible agents.
Applications and Related Literature
Consider a selective supervision mechanism where the agent can decide whether to be supervised or not.
Depending on the agent's characteristics, he may prefer one regime to the other. There are many realworld examples of this kind of mechanism. Within …rms, the scope and intensity of supervision usually varies depending on the agent's characteristics. Selective supervision sheds light on the formation of such hierarchy structures and explains them as a result of the threat of collusion. Apart from …rms, other real-world examples include self-reporting of illegal acts, wherein o¤enders can choose to report their illegal acts directly to principal by choosing a mechanism that bypasses the supervisor. The literature on law enforcement has long highlighted that self-reporting allows the government to save money by reducing enforcement costs. 7 This paper tackles the issue from a di¤erent angle, suggesting a new and di¤erent advantage to the use of self-reporting: namely, the reduction of the costs associated with the threat of collusion. Another example is that of tax amnesties where the agent is induced to report his type directly to the principal, bypassing the supervisor's inspection. The same applies to immigration amnesties. 8 These applications are further discussed in the last part of Section 4.
The concept of selective supervision shares some similarities with the mechanism proposed by Dequiedt (2006) and Celik and Peters (2010) . The latter studies an example of a mechanism-design problem where the players can coordinate their actions in a default game. They show that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms that will be rejected on the equilibrium path. It may be useful to re-label aspects of their framework to highlight the similarities with the environment considered here. The two players in their model can be thought of as the supervisor and the agent in our framework. The default game corresponds to the principal's mechanism in this paper, whereas the coordination-mechanism corresponds to the collusive side-contract between the agent and the supervisor. Consequently, the scope of the present contribution goes beyond the one proposed by Celik and Peters (2010) in that it considers endogenously determined "default" games. Even though their setting is di¤erent from the one considered here, there is one aspect which is common to both contributions: participation decisions convey information about the types of the players. Dequiedt 7 See Kaplow and Shavell (1994), Innes (1999) and (2001). 8 Some of these issues are explored in a separate paper by Burlando and Motta (2008a) . They analyze the impact of self reporting on law enforcement when o¢ cers are corruptible. They show that a budget-constrained government may prefer an enforcement system based on corruption rather than one based on legal …nes. They conclude that the government can use self reporting as a way to clean up corrupt enforcement agencies. Unlike our paper, they do not adopt a mechanism design approach. Moreover our contribution considers a larger class of mechanisms, wherein self-reporting with a binary information structure for the supervisor is only one simple application.
(2006) considers a similar point in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto power.
In a related paper, Che and Kim (2006) study a general collusion setup where agents cannot collude prior to making their decision to participate in the mechanism. They conclude that the second-best payo¤ is implementable when players are risk neutral. Given the restrictions they impose on the correlation of information of the colluding parties, their result does not apply to the setup considered in this paper. On the contrary, it remains an open and intriguing question whether or not the strategy proposed in our framework applies to no-supervision setups such as the one they proposed.
We suspect that selective supervision is useful in a setting where collusion occurs prior to participation, though in that context it is unlikely to costlessly eliminate collusion. This issue remains to be explored in future research. A few interesting papers have already studied the implementation of collusion-proof mechanisms when agents can collude on their participation decisions, 9 but none of them have addressed this question yet. Among them, Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) analyze this problem in a supervision setup. 10 However they focus on a di¤erent question with respect to the one analyzed in our contribution. Namely, they consider two productive agents and explore the possibility that collusion may rationalize delegation to intermediaries uninvolved in production. In particular, they do not focus on the identi…cation of the optimal mechanism in the presence of collusion.
The General Model
This section proposes a setting that accommodates as special cases both Celik's (2009) Dequiedt (2007) consider auctions where bidders collude prior to participating. Che and Kim (2009) study an optimal collusion-proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation. They …nd that informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be signi…cantly exploited to reduce their possibility to collude. Dequiedt (2007) considers two bidders with binary types. He …nds that the seller can, at most, collect her reserve price when a bidder's valuation exceeds that price, if and only if a cartel can commit to certain punishment. Pavlov (2008) independently studies a problem similar to Che and Kim (2009) and reaches similar conclusions. Quesada (2004) studies collusion initiated by an informed party under asymmetric information. 10 Mookherjee (2006) provides an excellent survey of this strand of the literature. 11 The results would not change with a risk averse agent. Indeed, his ex post participation and incentive constraints would be identical and only those constraints are relevant for the analysis.
where t denotes the transfer he receives from the principal (P ), q is the output level and represents the unitary cost of production, which takes n possible values from the set = f 1 ; 2 ; :::; N g, where 0 < 1 :::
N . The distribution of the cost, f ( ), is common knowledge while A knows the realization of . The supervisor (S) receives a signal on A cost. is drawn from a discrete distribution on T = f 1 ; 2 ; :::; N g. The joint probabilities on ( i ; j ) are de…ned as p ij = P rob( = i ; = j ) with P n j=1 p ij > 0 for all i and
From the joint distribution above, one can derive the conditional probabilities p( i j j ). There is a positive correlation between signals and types when the monotone likelihood ratio property is satis…ed, This contract de…nes the outcome and the monetary transfer respectively for A and S as a function of S and A messages, which are denoted as m s and m a and belong respectively to the message spaces M s and M a . If the contract is rejected, the game ends with zero production and no monetary transfer to the players. In other words, the outside option is normalized to zero for both A and S.
Direct Supervision
To begin with, consider the case where the principal directly receives the signal on A private information. The Revelation Principle ensures that there is no loss of generality in looking for the optimal contract within the class of direct truthful revelation mechanisms of the form ft ( ); q ( )g where is A report on his unit-cost of production to P . For the sake of simplicity, denote by t ij (q ij ) A transfer (output schedule) when A reports that he has type i and P knows j . Let us also denote by
. When P observes a signal j , the standard treatment of this problem suggests that an output pro…le fq ij g i2[1;2;:::;N ] is implementable through a contract if and only if it is weakly decreasing. This condition is satis…ed when the following monotonicity constraint holds,
Furthermore, the agent's lowest utility levels that are compatible with this implementation are revealed by the participation constraints,
and the binding upward adjacent incentive compatibility constraints,
When P observes a signal j , he updates his beliefs on A type. The conditional probabilities are
p ij for j = 1; 2:::; N . The optimal contract solves max fq ij ;u ij g i2f1;2;::
subject to (2), (3), and (4).
The assumption lim q!0 W 0 (0) = 1 ensures positive production regardless of A cost type . The solution to this problem yields the conditionally-optimal second-best (hereafter referred to as secondbest), which implements the …rst-best outputs q sb 1j = q f b
1 for the most e¢ cient agent 15 and outputs q sb ij for the other ones. To begin with, consider the optimal outputs for those types i such that
Consider now the optimal outputs for those types that have zero probability to be realized when P receives the signal j, i.e., p( i j j ) = 0. In this case the quantity assigned to type i has no direct impact on P utility in that it does not a¤ect W (:). But q ij could a¤ect P utility indirectly by increasing the information rents that P has to forgo to those types that are more e¢ cient than i. In this case, it is optimal to assign type i a zero-output schedule q sb ij = 0. On the other hand, if the choice of q ij does not a¤ect condition (4) then any quantity q ij large-at-will can be optimally assigned, provided that the monotonicity constraint (2) is satis…ed. 16 For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that in this particular case q 
15 Note that the optimal output for the most e¢ cient type when p( 1 j i ) = 0 could be set to zero beacuse type 1 has zero probability to be realized following the signal i . Nevertheless, the quantity produced by type 1 has no material e¤ect on the incentive compatibility contraints. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the optimal output for the most e¢ cient type solves W 0 (q i1 ) = 1 even if p( 1 j i ) = 0: 16 For example, q ij does not a¤ect condition (4) when all the types i 0 that are more e¢ cient than i have zero probability of being realized when the signal is j.
This proposition clari…es how the informative signal a¤ects the optimal outputs. When j decreases, A is more likely to be e¢ cient. Reducing the information rents calls then for a greater reduction of the outputs for the less e¢ cient types. Proposition 1 entails that the information rents for all types are larger after the observation of 0 j than after j :
It follows that A strictly prefers higher signals to be realized.
Numerical Example
Consider a simple numerical example where W = ln(q) and = f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g = f0:25; 0:5; 1g. Under perfect information, P observes , and the …rst-best quantities q A receives zero information rent, i.e., U i = 0. On the contrary, under asymmetric information, P has to provide A with some information rent in order to induce him to report his type. It follows from the standard treatment of this problem that reducing the information rent of the e¢ cient types calls for a reduction in the output schedules of the ine¢ cient ones. The extent of this distortion depends on the information available to P . The informative signal serves exactly this purpose: following a certain realization of , P can optimally re-adjust the output schedule, alleviating the asymmetric information problem.
Example 1: FML' s (2003) Information Structure
We refer to direct supervision to indicate the case where P directly receives the signal . Under direct supervision, P can implement the second-best outcome. For example, consider the following conditional probabilities p( i j j ) :
The optimal quantities (referred to as "Output" in the table) and utility levels of A (referred to as U in the table) when A reports type i and P knows j are, When P receives the signal 1 he infers that A is more likely to be e¢ cient. Reducing A information rent calls then for a large reduction of the output schedule of types 2 and 3 . On the contrary, when P observes the signal 3 he knows that A is less likely to be e¢ cient. Being that the information rents are less of a concern, P increments the output schedule for 2 and 3 . where the signals 1 and 2 are redundant. When P receives the information directly (direct supervision) the second-best outcome is implementable. The optimal quantities (refereed to as "Output" in the The results are rounded to the second decimal place.
As before, the results are rounded to the second decimal place. When P learns 3 , he knows that A has type 3 . It follows that quantities q sb 13 = 4 and q sb 23 = 1:3 can be selected arbitrarily: they will never be chosen in equilibrium and they do not a¤ect the incentive compatibility constraints for type 3 (provided that the monotonicity constraint (2) is satis…ed).
If P does not receive the signal , he has to elicit this information from S. Whenever S and A collude, the mechanism presented above is no longer implementable. Regardless of the real realization of , S prefers to report 3 and then share the extra information rent with A.
Non-cooperative implementation
When S and A do not collude, FLM (2003) show that there is no loss of generality in restricting P to use direct truthful revelation mechanisms. Let us denote by s ijk (respectively t ijk and q ijk ) S wage (respectively A transfer and the output target) when A reports that he has type i and that S signal is k and when S reports she has observed j. For the sake of simplicity, write s ijj = s ij and t ijj = t ij .
Using the logic of Nash implementation, FLM (2003) show that P can costlessly elicit by inducing A and S to reveal their signal. A incentive constraints can be reduced to the following relevant incentive constraints:
and S gets zero wage s sb ij = 0 for all (i; j). Therefore, P can achieve the same outcome as with direct supervision. Moreover, FLM(2003) show that the out-of-equilibrium wages for S can be designed to ensure a unique Nash implementation. This outcome is feasible if S and A do not cooperate or P is capable of preventing them from communicating.
Cooperative implementation
The process of collusion is formalized by assuming that S makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to A, after the acceptance of the grand-contract by both parties. The side-contract is a pair SC = f (:); b(:)g where (:) is a collective manipulation of the messages (m s ; m a ) sent to P , while b(:) is A transfer received from S. As standard in this literature on collusion, this side-contract is assumed to be enforceable. 18 If A or S refuse the side-contract, the game is played non-cooperatively. Let us denote by u ij the status quo payo¤ that A receives when his type is i and S has received signal j, and they non-cooperatively play the truthful equilibrium of an individually incentive compatible mechanism.
By de…nition, u ij = t ij i q ij . A information rent obtained from truthfully playing the side-contract is
where j ( i ) denotes the manipulation of reports induced by the collusive side-contract when A reports having type i to S and the latter has observed j. Acceptance of the side-contract by all A types imposes the following ex post participation constraints:
We are now left to identify the manipulations that are available to S at the side contracting stage.
First, S cannot always distinguish the di¤erent A types. To circumvent this problem S must provide
A the incentive not to imitate the other types. Accordingly, for SC = f (:); b(:)g to be an available side-contract for S, the following constraints must be satis…ed
The optimal side-contract solves the following problem:
subject to (10) and (9) .
When the informative signal allows S to exactly observe A type, (11) becomes
subject to (9) .
The mechanism o¤ered by P is collusion-proof if the optimal side-contract proposed by S to A and accepted by all A types entails no manipulation of reports and zero side-transfers. P mechanism is thus collusion-proof when the optimal manipulation of reports j ( i ) is equal to ( i ; j ) for all (i; j) and the optimal transfer b (i; j) is equal to zero for all (i; j). Notice that any j ( i ) that solves (12) must also solve (11) but not vice versa. Therefore, collusion is more di¢ cult to prevent when there is no residual asymmetric information between A and S.
3 Selective Supervision Mechanism
Timing
The precise implementation of our mechanism depends crucially on the timing of S information. Let us denote by Timing 1 the framework in which S receives her information before P has the opportunity to o¤er her the mechanism. This is the setting adopted by Celik (2009) and FLM (2003):
At date 1, S learns and A learns and .
At date 0, P o¤ers a mechanism to S and A.
At date 1, A and S decide whether to accept or refuse the mechanism.
At date 2, S and A can stipulate a side-contract. If they do not stipulate a side-contract, the mechanism is played non-cooperatively by A and S.
At date 3, production and transfers take place.
This framework (Timing 1 ) rests on the assumption that S receives her informative signal in the …rst stage of the game. This assumption is unsatisfactory because it outlines a type of supervision that …ts a limited range of cases. Under this assumption, S can be thought as an "informed third party" or a "witness" who happened to learn some information about A even before P had shown any interest in contracting with her. Oftentimes, S information is instead acquired after an inspection or lengthy investigation, which takes place following the acceptance of P mechanism. Let us denote by This numerical example is identical to the one proposed in the previous Section, except that S and
A are now allowed to collude. In order to prevent collusion, P can design a Selective Supervision
Mechanism. By doing so, the second-best outcome can be implemented even when A and S collude.
The Selective Supervision Mechanism is designed in the following fashion: P o¤ers a menu of contracts (or organizational structures) to A. Each contract entails a di¤erent scope for supervision, ranging As before, the results are rounded to the second decimal place (where possible). The original results are presented in Appendix 1. In what follows, we provide a simple sketch of the basic features of the mechanism. The complete analysis in o¤ered in Appendix 1.
Contract 1
To begin with, suppose that S and A behave non-cooperatively. In this case S reports her signal truthfully. To see this point consider Contract 3. If S has observed 3 , her expected utility when she reports 3 is P 3 1 p( i j 3 )0 = 0. This expected utility is (weakly) larger than the one S would obtain by reporting 2 (0) or 1 ( 0:06). If S has observed the signal 2 , she is better o¤ reporting the true signal 2 (0:01) rather than reporting 1 (0) or 3 (0). Similarly, when S learns the signal 1 
that when A has type 1 or 2 the coalition A-S has no stake in misreporting the signal. Indeed, the sum of A and S payo¤s is exactly the same regardless of the signal reported by S: the coalition payo¤ is 0:8 when the type is 1 and 0:4 when the type is 2 . The potential for collusion arises only when A has type 3 . In this case, S could receive a negative payo¤. Consider a simple example where S has observed 2 . S would then like to report 3 when A has type 3 and get zero instead of a negative payo¤ ( 0:03). But this side-contract has to be o¤ered before A has revealed his type to S and S takes thus into account that changing what she commits to announce in state ( 3 ; 2 ) also a¤ects the information rent paid to the other types. In Appendix 1 we show that S is never willing to o¤er a side-contract to A. Thus, A optimally selects Contract j when the signal is j . This implements the second-best outcome.
Notice that this outcome is feasible because of one crucial assumption: namely, no-collusion in participation decisions. This assumption entails that A and S cannot collude on the selection of This kind of Selective Supervision Mechanism achieves the second-best outcome by endogenizing the scope of supervision. When there is high probability that the type is ine¢ cient (following signal 3 ) Contract 3 is selected: the organizational structure is then complex, with a large scope for supervision.
S has the possibility of managing a large number of signals, including the altogether bad news ( 3 ) that the type is likely to be highly ine¢ cient. On the contrary, when there is high probability that A is e¢ cient (following signal 1 ) Contract 1 is selected and the organization collapses into an informal contract between P and A where no supervision is involved.
Selective Supervision
A fast inspection reveals that this mechanism is collusion-proof and A optimally selects Contract j when the signal is j . This implements the second-best outcome. The formal proof is similar to the one for Example 1 and is omitted. As before, this kind of Selective Supervision Mechanism endogenizes the scope of supervision. When there is high probability that A is e¢ cient, the organizational structure is simple with no supervisory activity. On the other hand, when the type is ine¢ cient, S has the possibility of managing multiple signals.
In what follows, we will show that the Selective Supervision Mechanism always achieves the secondbest outcome in Celik's (2009) and FLM's (2003) frameworks. On the contrary, it may not achieve the second-best outcome when the timing of the game is Timing 2, the information structure is the one proposed by FLM (2003) , and N > 2.
Timing 1
Under Timing 1, the implementation of the Selective Supervision Mechanism is somewhat trivial. If S learns at date 1, P can costlessy elicit by o¤ering a menu of contracts to S. By assumption (no collusion in participation decisions), S selects the contract in a non-cooperative fashion because she cannot collude with A at this stage. Once the contract is selected, A and S can behave cooperatively 19 As before, the results are rounded to the second decimal place.
and agree to respond to P collusively.
Let us denote by s ijk (respectively t ijk and q ijk ) S's wage (respectively A's transfer and the output target) when A reports that he has type i and that S signal is k and when S selects the contract j. P can design the Selective Supervision Mechanism in such a way that selecting contract j is equivalent to reporting the signal j . Having this schedule in place, it is easy to see that this framework is equivalent to what discussed in Section 3 (Non-Cooperative Implementation). As before, write s ijj = s ij and t ijj = t ij . Using the logic of Nash implementation, P can costlessly elicit by inducing the agent and the supervisor to reveal their signal. A incentive constraints can be reduced to the following relevant incentive constraints:
and S gets zero wage s sb ij = 0 for all (i; j). Therefore, P can achieve the same outcome as with direct supervision.
Despite being trivial in general, the implementation of the Selective Supervision Mechanism is still interesting when S signal is binary, i.e., T = f 1 ; 2 g. This is the case in both Celik (2009) assumption. Clearly, if S is indispensable for production, P needs to design a Selective Supervision
Mechanism that entails a menu of contracts (as described in the …rst part of this paragraph).
Admittedly, it feels a bit arti…cial to bypass the problem of collusion by allowing P to o¤er a menu of contracts, whose selection is, by assumption, collusion-free. Nonetheless, it is also natural to expect P to be able to o¤er a menu of contracts. All considered, our result seems to suggest that a departure 20 Notes available from the author.
from the assumption of no-collusion in participation decision is required to develop a sound theory of collusive contracting under Timing 1. On the contrary, under Timing 2 the implementation of the Selective Supervision Mechanism is more challenging and the second-best outcome can be achieved only under certain parametric conditions. Therefore, the assumption of no-collusion in participation decision seems to be more natural under the latter timing.
Timing 2
In this section we discuss the implementation of the Selective Supervision Mechanism under Timing for all (i; j) such that i 6 = n and j 6 = n.
Note that these wages are either positive or equal to zero. They are speci…cally designed to ensure that the sum of the payo¤s of S and A is equal to A information rent when n is realized. The remaining optimal wages s nj are scheduled in the following fashion: s nj solves
By construction, s nj must be negative. These wages are designed to guarantee that S is willing to report her signal truthfully. 
It is possible to show that in both cases Proposition 2 the wage schedule induces S to report her signal truthfully:
This proposition helps to clarify the outcome of the game when A and S behave non-cooperatively.
The proposition implies that S reports her signal truthfully and from (4) follows that A reports his true type. This outcome is important because it constitutes A outside option from colluding with S.
In fact, if A refuses S side-contract, they end up playing P mechanism non-cooperatively. Having this schedule in place, we go on to present our main result.
Proposition 3 In the case where (i) the information structure is the one proposed by FLM and (ii) there are more than 2 types of agents Selective Supervision Mechanism (SC) implements the second-best outcome if both the distribution of the agent's production cost and the distribution of the supervisor's signal are not too dispersed. In all other cases, SC always implements the second-best outcome.
As we mentioned before, the Selective Supervision Mechanism may not achieve the second-best outcome when the timing of the game is Timing 2, the information structure is the one proposed by FLM (2003) , and N > 2. This is due to the fact that s nj could be a negative payo¤ large enough to induce S to prefer to misreport n . This is more likely to occur when both the distribution of the production cost and the distribution of the informative signal are dispersed. In order to avoid this misreport, P must increase S wage. This causes a distortion that pushes SC away from secondbest. One response to these …ndings is that there might exist an alternative Selective Supervision Mechanism (with a di¤erent wage schedule s ij ) that implements the second-best outcome even when the distribution of cost and signal are very dispersed. But a fast inspection reveals that this cannot be the case. In fact, it is possible to show that the Selective Supervision Mechanism proposed in this section highlights a general problem: inducing S to report her signal truthfully requires at least one wage s ij to be negative for a given signal j. Increases in the dispersion of cost and signal induces this negative payo¤ to further decrease: a threshold level is eventually reached where the negative wage is small enough and the second-best outcome is no longer implementable.
To conclude, our result suggests that collusion may still be a problem even under the assumption of no-collusion in participation decision. Under Timing 1 it is always costless to prevent collusion, but this might not be the case when Timing 2 is considered.
Remarks on Collusion-Proof Implementation

Collusive Behavior and Supervisory Information
A couple of issues concerning bargaining power and collusive behaviors are worth noting. Under Timing 1, results do not depend on the distribution of the bargaining power allocation inside the coalition nor do they rest on the identity of the coalition member who o¤ers and initiate the collusive agreement. Under Timing 2 and Celik's (2009) information structure our result is still robust to these aspects. Indeed, our proof is based on the strong notion of collusion-proofness expressed in (12) . On the contrary, under Timing 2 and FLM's (2003) information structure, we still require S to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to A.
Finally collusion-proof implementation does not depend on special assumptions about the accuracy of S information. For example, suppose S learns A cost, i.e., there is no residual asymmetric information between A and S. The mechanism simply reduces to a special case of Celik's (2009) information structure where p( i j i ) = 1 for all i.
Implication for Decentralization
The recent literature evaluating delegation when agents collude o¤ers an intriguing puzzle. FLM (2003) and Celik (2009) represent two in ‡uential papers in this literature. Despite the very similar setting they consider, the results of these papers are strikingly di¤erent: FLM (2003) …nd that delegation is always equivalent to centralization, whereas Celik (2009) …nds that centralization is superior in general.
The results of this paper seems to con…rm that centralization performs better than delegation. 21 The crucial assumption of no collusion in participation decisions drives this result. P can improve his payo¤ by contracting directly with S and A. This is due to the fact that participation decisions can be exploited to extract supplementary information. This is not possible under decentralized contracting.
Applications
The precise implementation of selective supervision depends on both the nature and the timing of the supervisor's information. First, consider the case where the information is binary. If the supervisor receives this information after the acceptance of the principal's o¤er, the example of the agent choosing between a regime with or without supervision applies. 22 On the other hand, if the supervisor receives her information before the acceptance decision there is an alternative mechanism available. In this case, the principal could o¤er a mechanism in which the supervisor can opt out in some states of the world. An example …tting this case is that of an advisor who is asked to write a recommendation letter for a student. The advisor may refuse to write the letter, revealing some information about the agent's type. By the same token, foreign embassies have the discretion to refuse immigration permits to applicants whom they do not consider suitable for admission. Similarly, hiring committees may refuse to o¤er interviews to certain candidates. Failure to receive interviews signal a portion of the private information available to the committees. In all these cases, the supervisor's decision to opt out conveys information about the applicants'characteristics.
When the nature of the supervisor's information is not binary, the implementation of selective supervision becomes more nuanced. In this case, the principal proposes a menu of mechanisms. Each contract speci…es a di¤erent scope for supervisory activity, where the scope of supervision refers to the dimension of the message space available to the supervisor. Applications include work contracts subject to di¤erent degrees of discretion, self-reporting schemes limited to certain crimes, letters of rec-ommendation with di¤erent degrees of approbation, restricted visa permits, tax amnesties for speci…c types of evasions, or work contracts subject to di¤erent degrees of discretion.
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the role of supervision in organizations involving both supervisory and productive tasks when these two tasks are performed by parties prone to collusion. The main contribution of the paper is to show the role of endogenous selection of supervisory activity by the principal.
If collusion between supervisor and agent can occur only after they have decided to participate in the mechanism, endogenous selection of supervisory activity can costlessly eliminate collusion. This conclusion is robust to alternative information structures, collusive behaviors and speci…cation of agent's types. Surprisingly, the cost related to collusion can be fully eliminated even when there is no residual asymmetric information between the agent and the supervisor. This paper, therefore, presents results in contrast to the important insight gained from Martimort (1997, 2000) that agents'asymmetric information constitutes an obstacle to collusive arrangements. Rather, this paper highlights the fact that the inability to collude prior to making a decision to participate in the mechanism represents an "Achilles'heel" of collusive coalition. The result that collusion can be eliminated at no cost in this environment allows us to highlight the important assumptions required for collusion to be a salient issue in the existing literature.
We suspect that selective supervision is useful in a setting where collusion occurs prior to participation, although in that context, it is unlikely to costlessly eliminate collusion. This issue remains to be explored in future research.
Appendix
Appendix 1: Numerical Example
The table below shows the optimal quantities q sb (referred to as "output" in the If S and A behave non-cooperatively, S reports her signal truthfully. To see this point take Contract 3 and suppose that S has observed 3 . Then S expected utility when she reports 3 is P 3 1 p( i j 3 )0 = 0. This expected utility is (weakly) higher than the one S would obtain by reporting 2 (0) or 1 ( 0:0528). When S learns the signal 2 , she is better o¤ reporting the true signal 2 (0:0129) rather than reporting 3 (0) or 1 (0). Similarly, when S learns the signal 1 she prefers to report truthfully (0:1622) rather than reporting 2 (0:05338) or 1 (0). Moreover, each contract is also collusion-proof, i.e., A and S do not collude. To see this point note that when A has type 1 or 2 the coalition A-S has no stake in misreporting the signal. Indeed the sum of A and S payo¤s is exactly the same regardless of the signal reported by S: the sum of A and S payo¤s is 0:8417 when the type is 1 and 0:3750 when the type is 2 . The potential for collusion arises when A has type 3 . In this case, S could receive a negative payo¤. Suppose that S has observed 2 . S would then like to report 3 when A has type 3 , and get zero instead of a negative payo¤ ( 0:0324). But this side-contract has to be o¤ered
-contracting stage, type 2 is now willing to report to S that he has type 3 and earn some extra information rent (0:0417). To prevent this, S has to provide type 2 with this extra information rent (0:0417). Moreover, in order for type 1 not to be willing to report to S that he has type 2 he also must see his information rent increased by the same amount (0:0417). Therefore, the costs of this side-contract (0:0417 + 0:0417) outweigh the bene…ts (0:0328). Clearly S would not like to report 1 when A has type 3 and get ( 0:1937) instead of ( 0:0324). Another possible strategy would entail reporting that the state is ( 2 ; 2 ) when the true state is ( 3 ; 2 ) . In this case to convince type 3 to accept the misreport S has to forgo (0:4902). It is su¢ cient to see that the bene…ts when type 3 is realized (0:0324) are not enough to cover the costs (0:4902). Another possible strategy would entail reporting that the state is ( 1 ; 2 ) when the true state is ( 3 ; 2 ). In this case to convince type 3 to accept the misreport S has to forgo (2:2549). It is su¢ cient to check that the bene…ts when type 3 is realized (0:0324) are not enough to cover the costs (2:2549). Another possible strategy would entail reporting that the state is ( 2 ; 3 ) when the true state is ( 3 ; 2 ). In this case to convince type 3 to accept the misreport S has to forgo (0:5583). It is su¢ cient to check that the bene…ts when type 3 is realized (0:0324) are not enough to cover the costs (0:5583). Another possible strategy would entail reporting that the state is ( 1 ; 3 ) when the true state is ( 3 ; 2 ). In this case to convince type 3 to accept the misreport S has to forgo (2:158 3). It is su¢ cient to check that the bene…ts when type 3 is realized (0:0324) are not enough to cover the costs (2: 158 3). Another possible strategy would entail reporting that the state is ( 2 ; 1 ) when the true state is ( 3 ; 2 ). In this case to convince type 3 to accept the misreport S has to forgo (0:2210). It is su¢ cient to check that the bene…ts when type 3 is realized (0:0324) are not enough to cover the costs (0:2210). The last possible strategy would entail reporting that the state is ( 1 ; 1 ) when the true state is ( 3 ; 2 ). In this case to convince type 3 to accept the misreport S has to forgo (2: 5895). It is su¢ cient to check that the bene…ts when type 3 is realized (0:03237) are not enough to cover the costs (2: 589 5). Using the same method, it is easy to check that S is not willing to misreport 3 when she has observed 1 . This proves that Contract 3 is collusion-proof. Finally, Contract 2 is also collusion-proof. To see this point, it is su¢ cient to note that S salary in state ( 3 ; 1 ) is larger in Contract 2 than in Contract 3. Therefore, if S is not willing to misreport 3 in Contract 3, she is also not willing to misreport type 3 in Contract 2. This establishes that the mechanism is collusion-proof.
Proof of Proposition 1
We have already shown that the second-best always implements the …rst-best output q Consider the case where i 6 = 1. Rearrange (1) and obtain
for all (i; i 0 ; j; j 0 ) such that j 
Recall that optimality requires (5) to be satis…ed. Condition (19) ensures that
This condition coupled with the fact that W 00 (:) < 0 establishes that q have also zero probability to be realized when P receives 0 j . Therefore, any quantity q i 0 j 0 large-at-will can be assigned, provided that the monotonicity constraint (2) 
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof has two parts. In the …rst part we prove that (17) is an incentive compatible mechanism that satis…es (4). By construction, A is induced to report his true type when he plays the mechanism non-cooperatively.
Part 1
To start with, note that from q sb ij = 0; follows p( i ; j ) = 0. In this case our information structure reduces to a connected partition structure. When S receives the signal j he has no stake in misreporting her signal as j 0 < j because U (s ij ) U (s ij 0 ) for all types i that have a positive probability to be realized when S receives the signal j. To see this point, note that there are only three possibilities: Naturally, S would bene…t from the misreport only in case (c): but those wages s ij 0 are never realized when S learns j. This proves that (17) holds for all j 0 < j. We are left to prove that (17) holds also for all j 0 > j. Note that if S receives the signal j he has no stake in misreporting her signal as j 0 > j because there are only three possibilities:
(a) U (s ij 0 ) = U (s ij ) when j 0 and j are redundant signals with p( i ; j ) = p( i ;
This follows directly from (16) .
for all i such that p( i ; j ) = 0. This follows again from (16) and from the information structure.
As before, S would bene…t from the misreport only in case (c): but those wages s ij 0 are never realized when S learns j. This establishes that (17) holds when at least one output schedule is equal to zero, i.e., q sb ij = 0.
Part 2
In the second part we prove that (17) holds when all output schedule are strictly positive, i.e., q sb ij > 0.
This part is divided into two sections.
Section (a):
We prove that (17) holds for all (j; j 0 ) such that j 0 > j. Using (15), compute the optimal value of U S (s nj+1 ) and U S (s nj )
We are now ready to prove that (17) is satis…ed for any j and j 0 = j + 1. Rearrange (17) and obtain
Substituting (20) and (21) into the former expression yields
This expression can be written as (14) ensures that (22) can be rewritten as
which is always satis…ed when the monotone likelihood ratio property applies. This proves that (17) is satis…ed for any j and j 0 such that j 0 = j + 1. We now prove that this result holds for any j and
We adopt the same solution concept as before. Using (15) , compute the optimal value of U S (s nj+2 ) and U S (s nj ) and then substitute them into (23)
After several rearrangements, this expression can be rewritten as
Adding and subtracting
(in the LHS) and U S s ij+2 (in the RHS) yields
Rearrange and obtain,
From (15) we know that
U S s ij+2 = 0, and above we have just proved
Therefore the right-hand-side of (24) must be negative. Recall that (14) implies that
0, therefore the monotone likelihood ratio property ensures that
This establishes that (17) is satis…ed for any j and j 0 = j + 2. A fast inspection reveals that the same strategy can be used recursively to prove that (17) is also satis…ed for j 0 = j + 3, j 0 = 1 + 4 and so on. Clearly for j = n (17) is trivially satis…ed. This establishes the …rst section of part 2.
Section (b):
We prove that (17) holds for all (j; j 0 ) such that j 0 < j. From (15) follows that
Note that the monotone likelihood ratio property also implies …rst-order stochastic dominance. The following conditions must hold
Substitute (25) into (27) , divide (26) by (27) and obtain
Using (15) we have
Clearly, this is a recursive argument: For example consider j 2 and j 3. From (15) follows that
Proceeding as before and using …rst-order stochastic dominance, we obtain
Applying the same solution concept for all j 0 < j yields
This establishes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof has two parts. In the …rst part we consider the case where at least one output schedule is equal to zero, i.e., Celik's (2009) information setup. In the second part we consider the case where all output schedules are strictly positive, i.e., FML's (2003) information setup. In both parts we will …rst prove that a generic contract n is collusion-proof. Secondly, we will prove that SC implements the second-best outcome.
Part 1
If there exists at least one output schedule q sb ij such that q sb ij = 0 then p( i ; j ) = 0. By assumption, our information structure reduces to a connected partition structure: this structure includes the case where S exactly observes A type. To prove that n is collusion-proof (even when S exactly observes A type) it is su¢ cient to show that j ( i ) = (i; j) solves (12) and the optimal transfer b (i; j) is equal to zero for all (i; j). For a given U ij , we need to prove that
for all (i; i 0 ; j; j 0 ). Notice that (16) implies that
for all i such that q 
Substituting the latter expression into (28) and using (29) twice we have
This condition always holds: to see this point note that (4) and (6) implies that u sb in
and from (9) follows that U ij u sb ij . This establishes that the generic contract n is collusion-proof:
A and S truthfully report (i; j) when S and A observe the signal j and A reports that he has type i. In the …rst stage of the game A selects one contract n . By assumption, at this stage A and S cannot collude. Therefore, A optimally select the contract j correspondent to the signal j that he has observed. A fast inspection reveals that A would not bene…t from choosing any other contract j 0 . When A observes j and select j we have that (a) S receives a wage equal to zero regardless of the realization of A type (b) A produces the conditionally-optimal second best output level q sb ij and receives transfer t sb ij . This proves that SC is collusion-proof and implements the conditionally-optimal second best.
Part 2
If q sb ij > 0 for all (i; j) then p( i ; j ) > 0 for all (i; j). Thus, to prove that n is collusion-proof we need to show that j ( i ) = (i; j) solves (11) and the optimal transfer b (i; j) is equal to zero for all (i; j).
In order for S not to be able to …nd a pro…table misreport the following condition must hold:
p( i j j )U S s i 0 j 0 + t i 0 j 0 i q i 0 j 0 U ij for all (i; i 0 ; j; j 0 ) and subject to (10) and (9) . Using (30) , rearrange this expression and obtain,
It is straightforward to prove that S, having observed signal j and learned that A has type i 6 = n through side-contracting, prefers to tell the truth rather than to report that the state of nature is 
To prove that this condition is satis…ed, note that (4) and (6) imply that u We are left to consider one last case: namely, we need to show the conditions such that S, having observed signal j and learned that A has type i = n through side-contracting, prefers to tell the truth rather than to report that the state of nature is (i 0 ; j 0 ). To begin with, consider the case where i 0 6 = n.
The bene…t of this misreport lies in the fact that S avoids the negative wage s nj . Nonetheless, given that u sb ij satis…es (4), it is costly for S to induce type n to misreport his type as any other type i 0 6 = n.
It follows that S has to provide type n with the following positive transfer to misreport his type as This side-contract has to be o¤ered before A has revealed his type to S, and S thus takes into account that changing what she commits to announce in state (n; j) also a¤ects the information rent paid to all other A types. Namely, the need to provide type n with the transfer b nj increases the information rent for the other types. From (10) derives that all types i > n must be provided with extra information rent. This coupled with (9) implies that U ij > u sb ij . Let us denote with b U ij = U ij u sb ij this extra information rent. Therefore, S having observed signal j and learned that A has type i = n through side-contracting, prefers to tell the truth rather than to report that the state of nature is (i 0 ; j 0 ) if
for all (i 0 ; j 0 ) where i 0 6 = n. This condition is satis…ed when s nj is large enough, i.e., close enough to zero. Let us denote by e s nj the threshold value of s nj such that (33) is satis…ed.
S can also try to avoid the negative payo¤ s nj by reporting that the state of nature is (n; j 0 )
when the true state is (n; j). This misrepresentation is never bene…cial for all j 0 < j because in this case s nj > s nj 0 . Nonetheless it could be bene…cial for j 0 > j. In the case where the bene…t of the misreport lies in the fact that S improves her payo¤ by s nj 0 s nj when type n is realized. But again this side-contract has to be o¤ered before A has revealed his type to S, and S thus takes into account that changing what she commits to announce in state (n; j) also a¤ects the information rent paid to all other A types. Given that q nj 0 q nj for all j 0 > j, S has to provide all types i > n with an extra information rent equal to ( n n 1 ) (q nj 0 q nj ).
In conclusion, S, having observed signal j and learned that A has type n through side-contracting, prefers to tell the truth rather than to report that the state of nature is (n; j 0 ) if
p( i j j )U S s ij ( n n 1 ) (q nj 0 q nj ) for all j 0 > j. As before, this condition is satis…ed when s nj is large enough, i.e., close enough to zero. 
If condition (35) holds then n is collusion-proof: A and S truthfully report (i; j) when S and A observe the signal j and A has type i. In the …rst stage of the game A selects one contract n .
By assumption, at this stage A and S cannot collude. Therefore, A optimally selects the contract j correspondent to the signal j that he has observed. A fast inspection reveals that A would not bene…t from choosing any other contract j 0 . When A observes j and selects j we have that (a)
S receives a wage equal to zero regardless of the realization of A cost type, and (b) A produces the conditionally-optimal second-best output level q sb ij and receives transfer t sb ij . This implements the conditionally-optimal second best-outcome and proves that SC is collusion-proof. One …nal aspect is worth noticing: it is easy to see that condition (35) is always satis…ed when N = 2. Therefore, SC always implements the second-best outcome in the setting proposed by FML (2003) . Moreover, from the construction of s nj , it follows that (35) is more likely to hold when the distribution of the agent's production cost and the distribution of the supervisor's signal are not too dispersed.
